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AbstraeL The paper introduces a concept of "efficiency set" in the context of group decisions and 
analyses its properties. If the set contains a single element, then the Borda rule finds it. Otherwise, 
the group needs a value function to choose from the efficient alternatives. Two value functions, 
with considerations for the number of participants who are badly affected by the choice, have been 
discussed. It turns out that the consistency axiom of group choice imposes a constraint, on the 
form of the value function, with questionable normative significance. 
1. Introduction 
The possibility or impossibility of  the construction of  a complete social order- 
ing of  actions or events f rom individual preferences is one of  the core issues 
in the literature on public choice theory. It is also recognized that the theory 
of  public choice is more concerned with the choice set than with a complete so- 
cial ordering (Sen, 1970). If  the social choice set does not exist, then some kind 
of  voting procedure becomes necessary. One of  the simple voting procedures 
suggested in the literature is known as Borda Count, named after Jean-Charles 
Borda (1781). The procedure may be explained as follows. Suppose, there are 
m actions to choose from. Give each of these m actions a score from 1 to m 
on its ranking in a voter 's  preference ordering. The highest ranking action 
receives m, next m - 1 points and so on. The action with highest points in the 
aggregate, is the winner. In case of  a tie, an adjusted Borda rule may be used 
(see Black, 1958). Young (1974) contains a discussion on the axiomatic basis 
for the Borda rule. One difficulty with the Borda Count is that it may not be 
strategy-proof (Sen, 1984). An individual in the group may be able to manipu- 
late the group decision by deliberately misrepresenting his preferences if he 
knows others' preferences. However, if the group is large, it is difficult to know 
everybody else's preference ordering and it is also unlikely that a single in- 
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 dividual can manipulate the group decision (Mueller, 1989). Another problem 
with Borda Count is that it assumes the intensity of  the preferences to be equal- 
ly spaced by ranking preferences by successive integers which is a special case 
of  linear scoring rule. In this paper, we shall examine how to eliminate some 
actions without using any scoring rule and discuss methods of  selecting the best 
action which may be regarded as nonlinear extensions of  the Borda rule. 
2. The Borda procedure re-examined 
Consider a finite set of  actions X = (x 1 . . . . .  Xm) from which a particular ac- 
tion has to be selected by a group of N individuals. Following the Borda rule, 
each individual assigns m points to the most preferred action, m - 1 points 
to second best action and soforth. Consider the proport ion of  individuals who 
regard x i as the best action, the proportion of  individuals who regard r~ as the 
second best action and so on. fi(xi) and fj(xj) represent the distribution of  these 
proportions for x i and xj respectively. For example, fj (xj = 3) is the number of  
persons who considers xj as their third choice, f rom the bot tom of  their prefer° 
m 
ence list, divided by size of  the group (N). Clearly, E fj(xj) = 1. Borda 
xj=l 
rule implies the selection of  that action which has the highest expected count, 
m m 
i.e., x i will be selected over xj if ~ xifi(xi) is greater than ~ xjfj(xj); xi, 
xi=l xj=l 
xj = 1,2 . . . . .  m. Suppose, there are three alternatives and the first action (xl) 
is given 1 point by 20% of  the voters, 2 points by 50% of  the voters and 3 points 
by 30o/o of  the voters. If  an individual is selected arbitrarily from the group, 
the expected score o f x  1 is 1(.2) + 2(.5) + 3(.3) = 2.1. One way to justify the 
Borda procedure is to argue that if a person is selected arbitrarily f rom the 
group, the action which is likely to receive the highest expected score should 
win. This argument may also be used to justify the majority rule. Consider the 
case of  two alternatives, one of  which receives 55% of  the votes. Why should 
the losers accept the verdict of  the majority? An answer may be the following. 
In a democratic society, there should be no discrimination amongst voters. I f  
an individual is selected arbitrarily as the representative voter, the action which 
wins the majority vote is more likely to be selected by this representative in- 
dividual. The annonymity (equal weight) condition may thus be used to justify 
the majority rule. It must be clearly understood that the outcome of  the simple 
Borda procedure depends not only on the individual preferences but also on 
the linear scoring system accepted by the group as a whole. The linear scoring 
system relates the score and the rank (place in individual preference ordering) 
in the following way: 
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 S(r) = a + fi.r, f l > O .  (1) 
In Eq.(1), r represents the rank. In simple Borda rule, a = 0 and j3 = 1. So 
long the scoring system is linear, variation in oL and fl does not affect the choice 
by Borda rule. 
Once the Borda procedure is viewed in the way as outlined above, shortcom- 
ings of  the simple Borda rule becomes quite obvious. It is apparent that in 
selecting the best action, the entire profile of  each distribution fk(Xk), X k e X 
should be compared rather than the expected values. Again, consider the case 
of  4 alternatives: xp  x 2, x 3, x 4. Suppose, x 4 receives 4 points f rom 70% of the 
voters, x 1 receives 4 points from 30% of  the voters and all voters give 3 points 
to x 3 and 2 points to x 2. The expected score of  x 4 is 3.1 vis-h-vis the expected 
score of  3 for x 3. If  x 4 is chosen, 30% of  the voters will receive the worst deal. 
There is a trade of f  between gain in expected score and the intensity of  dislike 
from the losers. If  the group is sensitive about the selection of  an action which 
is ranked significantly low in the preference ordering of  a substantial minority 
in the group, it may use the following nonlinear value function known as the 




v ( i )  = 
r(xi)" fi(x i ) 
xi= 1 
(2) 
where 7(xi) is decreasing in x i and fl > 0. I f  larger proportion of  individuals 
put x i at the bottom of  their preference ordering relative to xj, then under the 
value function V the Borda index is downwardly adjusted for x i. V(i) is a non- 
linear value function because it is a nonlinear mapping of  the function fi(xi) on 
1 
the real line. Note, if 7"(Xi) is chosen as (Xi--:~i)2 with fl = ~ ,  then Eq.(2) is 
the inverse of  the coefficient of  variation. Note, ~i = Zxi'fi for all i. Higher 
expected score increases the attraction of  an alternative and higher variance of  
fi(xi) reduces the attraction. The reader may note a conceptual affinity be- 
tween risk aversion and a bias towards the voters who are not doing well under 
the Borda rule. The former implies a bias against loss making, the later implies 
a bias against imposing a bad choice on some members of the group. 
The Borda rule uses the information contained in the ranking of  actions by 
each individual according to his preference. However, even if one action is 
preferred to another by two individuals, the intensity of  preferences may vary. 
However, it is not possible to make interpersonal comparison of  the intensity 
of preferences and, under the Borda rule, the group collectively treats each in- 
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 dividual ranking of alternatives without any bias. However,  without being bi- 
ased towards any individual, the group may feel that pulling up some people 
at the bot tom of  their preferences by one mark at the cost of  pulling down an 
equal number  of  people at the top of  their preference ranking by one mark  is 
justified. In such a case, the group may be motivated to use a value function 
like the adjusted mean criterion. The problem with the adjusted mean criterion 
as formulated in Eq.(2) is that it may lead to the selection of  an inefficient ac- 
tion or alternative. Therefore,  the application of  such a criterion must be res- 
tricted to the set o f  efficient actions. In the next section, we shall explain the 
criterion of  efficiency and its implications. 
3. The efficiency set 
One of  the problems with the simple Borda procedure is that  it adopts a linear 
scoring system. To say the least, ordering preference by successive integers is 
a crude method of ranking. To quote Black (1958: 65): " O u r  criticism is that 
no merit ranking of  this kind exists; and if this is so, no possible justification 
for the Borda criterion can be got along these l ines." Therefore,  it is useful to 
see whether it is possible to eliminate certain actions f rom group choice without 
taking recourse to any kind of  scoring system linear or nonlinear. 
Let us define Ft(xi) = 
t 
x i=  1 
fi(xi), 1 _ t _  m - 1. 
Definition 1. The action x i dominates the action xj in pairwise comparison if 
and only if Ft(xi) < Ft(xj) for all 1 ___ t < m - 1. An action which is not domi- 
nated by any pairwise comparison is called a dominant action. The set o f  
dominant  actions is called the Efficiency Set. 
The idea behind dominance is as follows. Suppose, each member  of  the group 
is given k number  of  "ch ips"  (interpret k = m -  t) and is asked to assign one 
chip to each of  k actions at the top of  their list o f  preferences. I f  action x i 
receives more chips than the action xj for all values of  k, then the action x i 
dominates the action xj and the action xj should not be chosen by the group 
when x i is available. To put it in another way, suppose we ask the members of  
the group to select k actions (1 ___ k _<_ m - 1) f rom the top of their list of  prefer- 
ences. Let x i be an action which is chosen by a larger number  of  members  than 
those choosing xj. I f  x i is chosen by a larger number  of  members  for all values 
of  k, then x i is said to dominate xj. 
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 Proposition 1. The relation of  dominance is transitive. 
Proof: Suppose x i dominates xj and xj dominates x k. Then by definition Ft(xi) 
< Ft(xj) and Ft(xj) < Ft(Xk) for all 1 _< t _ m - 1. Therefore,  Ft(xi) < Ft(Xk) 
for all t, implying that x i must dominate x k. QED 
Proposition 2. (Consistency) Consider two groups of  individuals N t and N 2. 
If in both the groups x i dominates xj then also in the combined group N = N 1 
U N 2, x i dominates xj. 
Proof: Since in both the groups (1,2), x i dominates xj. 
F k(xi) < F k(xj), k = 1,2, for all t < m - 1. 
Let m k = Nk/(N 1 + N2). The the following inequality holds, 
12 mk.Fk(xi) < ~ mk.Fk(xj) for all t < m - 1. 
k k 
Noting that for the combined group Ft(xi) = ~ m k.F k (xi), the proposi- 
k 
tion follows immediately. QED 
Proposition 3. If  x i dominates xj, the total score of  x i will be greater than that 
of  xj whatever be the form of  the scoring function provided the scores are in- 
creasing with the rank. 
Proof: Total score of  x i is given by N r~ xi. f(xi). Therefore,  if the expected 
score of  x i is greater than that of  xj then it also holds for the total score. Hadar  
and Russell (1969, Theorems 1 and 2) contains the proof  that the expected score 
of  x i is greater than that of  xj for any scoring function increasing with the 
rank, if and only if x i dominates xj. In order to economize on space we refrain 
from reproducing the proof  here. QED 
Proposition 4. For a finite group of  individuals choosing from a finite set of  
actions, the Efficiency Set always exists. 
Proof: Suppose the efficiency set is empty. If the efficiency set does not exist, 
then each action is dominated by at least one other action, e.g., x i is dominat- 
ed by xj, xj is dominated by x k and so on. By Proposition 2, the relation of  
dominance is transitive and therefore non-cyclical. Consequently, the chain of  
dominance must lead to an action in the limit which dominates all other actions 
and is therefore undominated. This contradicts the assumption that the effi- 
ciency set is empty. QED 
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 Proposition 5. I f  an action exists which could win under the majori ty  rule, then 
this action is included in the Efficiency Set. 
Proof: I f  more than N / 2  individuals prefer x i to other actions, x i is chosen 
under the majori ty rule. In this case Ft(xi) < Ft(xi) for t = m - 1 and for all 
j ~ i. Therefore,  x i is an undominated action. QED 
Proposition 6. The action chosen by the Borda rule is contained in the efficien- 
cy set. 
Proof: Let x i be the winner by the Borda rule and xj be another action which 
dominates x i. By Proposit ion 4, under any scoring rule, the total score of  xj 
must be greater than that  of  x i. But we know that the winner by the Borda rule 
has the highest score under the linear scoring system. Therefore,  xj can not 
dominate x i. QED 
A group decision making process is said to be faithful (Young, 1974; Fishburn, 
1979), if  " the  most preferred action(s) by the g roup"  and " the  most  preferred 
action(s) by the individual" are same if the group is reduced to a single in- 
dividual. The efficiency set satisfies this critierion of  faithfulness. 
Proposition 7. I f  the group consists of  a single individual, the efficiency set 
picks up the action which is most  preferred by the individual. 
Proof: Suppose the group consists o f  a single individual and without any loss 
of  generality assume that he prefers x I to all other actions. Then we have 
Fl(x 1) = Fa(Xl) = . . . . . .  = F m_ l(xl) = 0. For j ;~ 1, Ft(xj) must  equal 1 for  
t _> t* for  some t* _< m - 1. Therefore,  x 1 must dominate all other actions 
and is the only element in the efficiency set. QED 
In general the efficiency set contains more than one action. In choosing be- 
tween actions without selecting any specific scoring function (ordinal ranking) 
this is the limit o f  success. I f  the efficiency set contains a single element, then 
the Borda rule will pick it up. However,  we do not know a priori that  this is 
the case. The problem is, how to select an action f rom the efficiency set. The 
choice of  the scoring system and the considerations regarding the method for 
processing the scores (value function) enters at this stage. The group can use 
a linear scoring system together with a non-linear value function like Eq.(2). 
But considerations for efficiency and dominance should have priority before 
the use of  any scoring system, otherwise the use of  a non-linear value function 
may result in the choice of  a dominated action. 
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 4. An alternative secondary criterion 
Eq.(2) offers us a secondary criterion which may be applied to choose f rom the 
efficiency set. In most  cases of  democratic decisions, the voting procedure pays 
special consideration to those who are not doing well under the voting mechan- 
ism. An extreme case is the provision of  veto, which entitles a member  to pre- 
vent the group f rom taking a decision which is not liked by the member .  In this 
section, we shall propose an alternative secondary criterion which may be used 
to choose an action f rom the efficiency set. Suppose, the group uses a certain 
rank f rom the bo t tom in the preference list as the benchmark between bad  
ranks and acceptable ranks. For  example, consider rank 2 as the benchmark  
rank. This is purely a reflection of  the value judgments within the group. Let 
c~j(2) be the propor t ion of  the populat ion which ranks xj, j = 1,2 . . . . .  m, at 
2 or less. I f  Fj(t) denotes the proport ion of  populat ion which gives the action 
xj a rank of  t or less, aj(2) -- Fj(2). All the actions may be ranked according 
to aj and the group may decide to choose that action which minimizes aj(2). 
In case of  a tie, the group may choose any one of  them. We shall refer to this 
as the a(t)-criterion where t refers to the benchmark rank. By itself, t~(t)- 
criterion is not a very attractive criterion but it can be used to arrive at a com- 
promised solution. 
Proposition 8. I f  x i is a winner under the ~(t)-criterion with no ties, for all 
values of  t _< m - 1, then x i dominates all other actions and is a winner under 
the Borda rule. 
Proof: I f  x i is a winner under the a(t)-criterion with no ties for all t, the Fi(t ) 
< Fj(t) for all t ___ m - 1 and j ~ i. Hence, x i dominates all xj, j ~ i. Since 
x i dominates all other actions, it must be the only element in the efficiency set. 
Since the winner under the Borda rule is always contained in the efficiency set 
(Proposition 7), x i must be a winner under the Borda rule. QED 
Proposition 9. I f  x i is a winner under the o~(t)-criterion for any particular value 
of  t, then x i is contained in the Efficiency Set. 
Proof: I f  x i is a winner under the offt)-criterion for t = t*, then Fi(t* ) _ Fj(t*), 
j ~ i. By the definition of  dominance,  there is no xj which can dominate x i. 
Therefore,  x i must  be included in the efficiency set. QED 
The a(t)-criterion may,  by itself, be viewed as an extreme criterion where the 
interest o f  the average member  is totally dominated by the adversely affected 
group which may be very small. However,  it is also true that the voting proce- 
dure which does not pay any attention to the size of  the adversely affected 
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 group may call the stability of  the group in question. It seems natural that the 
group should consider both the expected rank of each action (derived from the 
Borda procedure) as well as its rank according to the a(t)-criterion for an 
agreed value of  t -- t*. This alternative secondary criterion may be expressed 
by a value function: 
v(i) = v ( E i , o t i ( t * ) )  , v 1 > 0 ,  v 2 ,< 0 (3) 
The actions included in the efficiency set should be ranked according to the 
value function v(i) and the action with the highest value should be chosen by 
the group. The motivation behind such a value function is somewhat different 
from that of  the adjusted mean criteria. In order to explain it, let us refer back 
to the example in Section 2, where choice has to be made from 4 alternatives. 
70% of  voters gives a mark of  4 to x 4 and 30°70 does the same to x r Everyone 
gives a mark of  2 to x 2 and 3 to x 3. Suppose the group hates the idea to force 
its members in accepting the worst outcome and sets its benchmark at the 
modest level of  t -- 1. The group selects that alternative which minimizes the 
proportion of  population for which it is the worst outcome. The alternatives 
x 1 and x 4 drops out of consideration with O~2(2 ) = %(2) = 10007o. However, 
the expected marks or the Borda counts for x 2 and x 3 are 2 and 3 respectively. 
Given a value function like Eq.(3), the alternative x 3 is chosen by the group 
although x 4 has a higher Borda count of  3.1. 
The adjusted mean criterion is essentially a generalized Borda procedure 
with a sympathetic consideration for those members of  the group who are bad- 
ly affected by the group choice. In Eq.(2) if ~'(xi) = 1 for all i (or/3 is close to 
0), the Borda rule is optimal. Any deviation from the Borda rule will essentially 
depend on the relative magnitude of  weights, T(xi) assigned by the group to its 
members having a raw deal and to the extent (/~) by which the winners in the 
group are prepared to accomodate the losers. It should be emphasized that like 
Eq.(2), Eq.(3) only provides us with a secondary criterion to be applied only 
to the set of  efficient actions, otherwise it may pick up an inefficient action 
which is certainly not desirable. 
5. The consistency axiom and quasi-linearity 
One feature of  the Borda rule is that it satisfies the consistency assumption 
(Young, 1974); Fishburn, t979). Stating the axiom in a simple manner, if using 
a choice procedure two groups of  voters N 1 and N 2 choose xj separately then 
the choice procedure is said to be consistent if the combined group is also re- 
quired to choose xj. Furthermore,  any alternative not chosen by any one of  the 
groups is, in some sense, not as " g o o d "  as an alternative chosen by both. This 
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 concept of  consistency does not extend to efficiency sets or to the alternative 
secondary rules discussed in this paper. The reason why they do not satisfy the 
consistency axiom requires an understanding of  the nature of  restrictions im- 
posed on the choice procedure by the consistency axiom. 
Let f = [fl(xl),  f2(x2) . . . . . . . .  fm(Xm)} be the set of  score distributions and 
F be the set of  all possible f, F = [ f }. The choice function is a mapping • which 
maps F on X. 
• : F ---, X (4) 
Definition 2. The mapping ff is said to be quasi-linear if, ~(f*) f3 ~(f**) = 
{xj} implies that ~(ozf*+(1-o0f**)  ~ {xj}. where 0 < ot _ 1. 
Consider two groups of  voters N 1 and N 2 with two profiles, f* and f**, of the 
score distributions of  the available actions for the two groups. For the com- 
bined group, let fa be the profile of  score distributions of  the available actions. 
It is clear that fa = off* + (1 - c0 f**  where a = Nz/(N 1 +N2). Remember, f* 
and f** are vectors of  density functions. Suppose, ~(f*) = ~(f**) = xj then 
quasi-linearity implies that ¢(fa) = xj. 
Definition 3. The mapping • is consistent if for ~(f*) O ~(f**) ;e 0, ~(f*) f) 
4~(f**) C cI'(fa). 
Since fa = otf* + (1-or)f** with 0 _< et < 1, consistency implies quasi- 
linearity. Apparently, this is a severe restriction on the choice function # and 
there is no a priori reason why 4, should satisfy this restriction. The Borda rule 
satifies this restriction in a trivial way. Since under the Borda rule • selects xj 
to maximise E(fj(xj)), it is clear that when both groups choose xj*, for the com- 
bined group 
Max E (fa) = Max [o~E(f*)+ (1-o0E(f**) l  = E(fa,j,(x~')) 
:'q x i 
because fa is a convex combination of  f* and f**. Therefore x~is also in the 
choice set of  the combined group. The density function of  xj~is denoted above 
by fa,j,(xj,). The consistency property need not hold good when the group de- 
cision depends not only on the expected value but also on other features of  the 
score density functions. Suppose, the decision of  a group depends both on the 
expected score and the second order non-central moment (/z2) of  the score den- 
sity functions and the choice is made using a value function like Eq.(2). This 
is done by choosing r(xi) = xi2, for all i. In this case, by Eq.(2), 
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 ~1. 2 
xj (G-l) 
x i (G-1G 
/ / "x j  (G-2) 
Figure 1. 
V0) = p.l/O~2)/3 , ~ > 0. (5) 
For  the combined group,  the score density funct ion o f  the i-th act ion is: fa(Xi) 
= afl(xi) + (1-ot)f2(xi)  where ~ = N1/(N 1 +N2).  Therefore ,  the k-th mo-  
ment  o f  the score distr ibution o f  the combined group is: 
t*~(i) = ]]fa(Xi)'xi k = ot-t*~(i) + (1 -cO ' /*  2 (i) (6) 
In other  words,  the k-th order  momen t  o f  x i for  the combined group is a con- 
vex combina t ion  of  the k-th order  momen t  o f  x i for  each group separately.  
For  the combined group,  the expected score (/~1) and #2 for  the i-th action is: 
hi(a) = otEi(1 ) + (1-o t )Ei (2  ) = #l,i(a)and/~2,i(a) = ct#2,i(1 ) + (1-ot)/.t2,i(2 ). 
In other  words,  for  a given act ion i, the values o f  t~l and P'2 for  the combined 
group would be the convex combinat ion  o f  the values in each group  separately. 
In Figure 1, the values o f  (/~1,#2) for  the action j has been presented as 
x j ( G -  1) for  group 1 and as x j ( G - 2 )  for  group 2. For  the combined  group 
(G), (#1,/~2) is given by xj(G). If  in Eq.(5) we assume ~ = 1, then the group in- 
difference curves in the (th,/~2) plane are given by equat ions 
#1 = c/~2, c > 0 (7) 
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 and are representable by straight lines originating from the origin in Figure 1. 
In such a case, the consistency property for group decisions will hold good. But 
there is no reason why/3 should be equal to 1. For/3 < 1, the indifference curves 
in the (~l,#Z) plane are given by 
/zl = c/z2~, 3 < 1, c > 0 (8) 
Such indifference curves have been shown in Figure 1. Suppose, the score dis- 
tribution for the i-th action has the same values for  #1 and #z for both the 
groups and is denoted by x i ( G -  1 , G - 2 )  in Figure 1. Both groups prefer the 
j-th action to the i-th action. But given appropriate relative sizes, the i-th action 
is preferred to the j-th action by the combined group, i.e., x i ( G -  1 , G - 2 )  is 
preferred to xj(G). Examples of  such violations of  the consistency property 
may be easily constructed. The only situation where such violations may not 
occur is when ~ = I. Then the preferences are quasi-linear, i.e., the indiffer- 
ence curves in Figure 1 are straight lines and in this case rays through the origin. 
Further, it may be pointed out that in the context of  our example, straight line 
indifference curves have a counter-intuitive implication. Let V denote the vari- 
ance in score. We know that by definition V = ~2 - #12. In the case of  
straight line indifference curves along any particular indifference curve we 
have/z 2 = k + k/~l, k, k > 0. From these two relationships, we obtain V = 
k + ~#1 - /~12" Therefore, along any indifference curve dV/d/~ 1 = X - 2/z~. 
For a sufficiently high lzl, dV/d#l  < 0. In other words, if two actions x i and 
xj have same expected score (#1) but scores are more polarized with respect to 
xj, the group prefers xj to x i. On the other hand, using Eq.(8) we get, V = 
[(1/c)/zl]l/~ - #12. It is easy to see that for 0 < c < 1 and/3 < 1A, dV/d/z 1 
> 0 everywhere along any indifference curve. 
One can also easily check that the combined group index for oq(t*) is the 
convex combination of  separate group indices for oq(t*). Thus the consistency 
condition is satisfied when the value function v in Eq.(3) is linear. In Eq.(2), 
consistency requires that the preferences are quasi-linear. If  preferences are 
nonlinear, as one expects them to be, the choice procedures are likely to violate 
the consistency axiom. Also note, the value function creeps into our discussion 
because, unlike Borda, we are considering the case where the choice procedure 
takes into account more than one property of  the score distribution functions. 
6. Conclusion 
Any problem of  choice has two aspects: (a) consideration of  efficiency leading 
to the identification of  an efficiency set; (b) selection of  a criterion to choose 
from the efficiency set. In welfare economics, the Pareto-criterion determines 
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 the efficiency set. Then we require a social welfare function or a criterion of 
fairness to select from the Pareto-efficient distributions. In problems of deci- 
sion making under uncertainty a similar method is called for (Fishburn, 1964). 
In financial economics, consideration of efficient portfolios precedes the selec- 
tion of the optimal portfolio. Similary, in problems of group decisions which 
involve processing of individual preferences, consideration of efficiency takes 
precedence over value judgments. We have discussed the definition and the na- 
ture of the efficiency set in the context of group decision making. The value 
judgments of a group are reflected in their choice of a value function. We have 
discussed two secondary criteria, namely adjusted mean criterion and the a(t) 
criterion, which pay some attention to the size of members badly affected by 
the choice. The consistency axiom of group choice is likely to be violated under 
such circumstances. 
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